DAY 41Its day 41. It still continues.......................
Read more about the Teesta Low dams (its technically not low as its height is more than 15 meters, more than double of that) ...................
"For Whom the Teesta Flows? - From: NFFPFW, Delhi Unit.A Report on the Teesta Low Dam Project III/IV " Read more about it...............
http://www.nespon.org/documents/teesta2.htm
Teesta Low Dam Project - III & IV
"The project is called the Teesta ‘Low Dam’ even when the dam heights are 32.5 and 30 metres. The globally accepted definition framed by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), categorises dams above 15 meters as large. It is called a ‘run of the river’ project even when reservoirs will impound water and submerge several hundred hectares of forest land." Read more about it..................................
http://www.esgindia.org/moefsuno2005/Teesta%20Lower%20Dam%20West%20Bengal.doc
"Plans to tame the Teesta in Sikkim are not new but the ones for `low dams' on the river are raising many concerns. MANJU MENON looks at the controversy." Read more about it.............
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/mag/2004/06/06/stories/2004060600260400.htm
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2 comments:
I just saw the report of Teesta III/IV that you have linked to the nespon website. However, the original report "For Whom the Teesta Flows" is a Fact Finding Report and I was on eof the team members of the team when I was working with an NGO Called Delhi Forum.
Since you are interested I am attaching herewith the full and original report.
I have so many docs on dams and hydel power, I don;t know which and how many of them you will want.
Souparna Lahiri
143 Khirki Village
New Delhi - 110 017
For Whom the Teesta Flows?
A Fact Finding Report on
the Teesta Low Dam Project III
Sunita Dubey (Environmental Justice Initiative)
R Sreedhar (Academy for Mountain Environics)
Souparna Lahiri (Delhi Forum)
For Whom theTeesta Flows?
A Fact Finding Report on the Teesta Low Dam Project III
Released
on
28 May 2004
by
Delhi Forum
F 10/12 Malviya Nagar
New Delhi – 110 017
Tel No. 91 11 26680883
Fax. 91 11 26687724
Email: delforum@vsnl.net
Contact
Sunita Dubey
sunitadubey@hotmail.com
R Sreedhar
environics@vsnl.com
Souparna Lahiri
lahiri.df@vsnl.net
Soumitra Ghosh
nespon@sancharnet.in
Preface
Government of India has proposed doubling the current electricity generation in the country, (around 109,831 MW, by March 2004) by adding another 100,000 MW of generation capacity during the X and XI five year plans, i.e. by March 2012. The Union Ministry of Power anticipates that Rs. 9 lakh crores (Rs. 90,000 Billion/$2,000 Billion) will be required to finance this additional capacity. Further, the former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee launched “50,000 MW hydro-electric initiative” in May 2003 by proposing 162 new Hydro Electric Projects (HEPs) in 16 states across the country and identified National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) as the nodal agency.
These decisions about the energy sector involving thousands of crores of public money have major implications for the people of this country; as citizens, energy consumers and people who the projects will affect directly they have to decide about development choices. A huge increase in capacity will affect millions of people and the natural resources of the areas where the projects will come up. NHPC’s record about rehabilitation and resettlement of the project affected is dismal, to say the least, as incidents like police firing on the displaced in Koel Karo (February 2001) and requisition of special armed forces for Narmada Sagar indicate.
This initiative also has implications for the national and foreign financial players and global power majors interested in expanding their markets in India. Recent indications that the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) may resume funding large dams in India add to our concerns.
A list of NHPC projects (to be completed by the end of the 11th Plan) shows 32 new hydel projects with generating capacity of more than 33,000 MW. The projects to be completed by the end of 10th Plan include Teesta V in Sikkim and Teesta Low Dam Project III and IV in North Bengal. Seven hydel projects—five more in Sikkim and two more in North Bengal in the Teesta River basin—are in the pipeline.
Concerns
The pace of the projects, investment mobilisation and, the manner in which the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) and Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) cleared some of these projects raised serious concerns amongst many environmental and human rights organisations and activists across the country.
One such project demanding a closer look is the Teesta Low Dam Project (TLDP) III, proposed on the River Teesta near Samco ropeway under the Kalimpong sub-division of Darjeeling district in West Bengal.
The local groups including the North Eastern Society for the Preservation of Nature and Wildlife (NESPON), several other NGOs like the Darjeeling NGO network and the local villagers of Geil Khola and 29th Mile have raised serious objections against NHPC violating the provisions of Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification 1994 under the Environment Protection Act, 1986, denying access to information about the project and participation of the local community in the so-called consultative process adopted by the NHPC.
In April 2003, in a letter to the Secretary, MOEF, NESPON, together with South Asia Network of Dams Rivers and People (SANDRP) and Kalpavriksh, raised strong objections against the proposed project. Separate letters were also written to various concerned agencies by NESPON and others indicating gross violations of legal provisions and procedures. Overriding all these concerns, the project was accorded environmental clearance by the MoEF in July 2003.
Concern was also raised on the cumulative impact of the series of ten dams on the Teesta and its tributaries. Teesta, having its source in the snow-capped eastern Himalayas, traverses 414 km. through Sikkim, the hills of Darjeeling, the plains of Jalpaiguri on its way to Bangladesh. It is a highly volatile, flood prone river and together with its tributaries constitutes a River Basin which with its deep forest cover and rich biodiversity is considered an integral part of the Indo-Myanmar biodiversity hotspot, one of the 25 such hotspots in the world. The Teesta River Valley system sustains a host of local tribal and indigenous communities dependent on traditional natural resource based livelihood. This area is also earthquake prone and includes a series of landslide and landslip zones.
The Fact Finding Mission
Under these circumstances, and at the request of NESPON, Delhi Forum, a Delhi based human rights organisation, decided to send a Fact Finding Team to the valley to enquire into the concerns and objections raised against TLDP III.
The Team
The Fact Finding Team comprised Sunita Dubey, Co-ordinator, Environmental Justice Initiative, Sreedhar Rammoorthy, Director, Academy for Mountain Environics and, Souparna Lahiri, Co-ordinator of Delhi Forum. Soumitra Ghosh, Secretary of NESPON accompanied the team during the visit.
The Team visited North Bengal University, NHPC project office and West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB), Regional Office in Siliguri, settlements in Kalijhora, Garubathan, 29th Mile, Geil Khola, Teesta Bazar and Darjeeling and met:
1. G Vaidya, Chief Engineer, NHPC
2. A K Basu, Chief Environment Engineer, WBPCB Regional Office
3. Dr. Ariz Aftab, District Magistrate, Darjeeling
4. Sonam W Bhutia, Dy. Magistrate and Development Officer, Darjeeling
5. Dr. Subir Sarkar, Reader, Department of Geography, North Bengal University
6. Prof. A P Das, Department of Botany, North Bengal University
7. Milindo Chakraborty, Director, CREATE, Darjeeling
8. Abhijit Majumdar, Siliguri Welfare Organisation
9. Gaulan Lepcha, MLA, Kalimpong
10. Prem Khawas, Himalayan Forest Workers Union
11. Villagers of Geil khola including Shyam Pradhan and the Project affected persons - Dhan Bahadur Pradhan, Krishna Bahadur Pradhan, (Porters), Bishnu Bahadur Chetri, Purna Bahadur Rai
12. Villagers of 29th Mile including Ganesh Raut
The Fact Finding Team visited the above areas between November 24 and November 29, 2003.
Terms of Reference of the Fact Finding Team
1. To find out possible socio-economic impacts of the project on the project affected and the people of the adjoining area, and to look into possible loss of livelihood, and details of the rehabilitation scheme;
2. To document in detail the complaints of the local people against the project authorities and violation of their rights to be a part of the decision making process;
3. To find out the grounds on which environmental clearance was given to the project and the extent of possible impact on the surrounding terrain and biodiversity of the area;
4. To observe and gather necessary information and data on the Teesta River Basin with the aim of evaluating the impact and feasibility of such projects proposed to be developed right across the River Basin ;
5. To explore the scope of facilitating a dialogue between the local people and the project authorities; and
6. To explore the possibilities of legislative and legal interventions.
The Fact Finding Team acknowledges the help and co-operation extended by all the people that the team met and particularly, the members of NESPON.
Teesta: the River and the Low Dam Projects
The River Teesta
Tista or Teesta is the largest river of Sikkim and North Bengal winding its way across the gorges and beautiful valleys of the eastern Himalayas. From its source in lake Cholamu, at an elevation of 17,500 ft., the Teesta comes out as a snout from the Zemu glacier above Lachen Gompha. It is joined by the Lhonk stream from the north. Another stream, Lachung rises from Pauhunri and meets the Teesta at Chumthang. From the hills of Sikkim the river winds it way through the hills of Darjeeling and plains of Jalpaiguri before crossing over to Bangladesh where it joins the mighty Brahmaputra. Most of the settlements in Sikkim and the hills of Darjeeling are found on the bank of this river, across the valleys with thick green cover, drained by a series of swift flowing streams and tributaries such as the Great Rangeet.
The Great Rangeet rises from the glacier of Kabru, and proceeds southwards till it meets the Rammam river coming down from its source near Phalut in the Singalila range. The combined waters, after traversing just a quarter of a mile, is joined by the Little Rangeet hailing from the base of the Tonglu spur in the Singalila range, and there from the Great Rangeet flows on for a distance of about 9 miles till it merges into the Teesta river.
Teesta is a rain and snow-fed river. The permanently snow-covered area of the river basin is about 158.40 sq. km. The catchment area of the river is 7755 sq. km. The upper catchment receives a total annual rainfall of 1,328 mm. while the middle of the basin receives 2,619 mm. It has been recorded that about 77-84 per cent of the annual rainfall is received between June and September.
The mountains have been extensively deforested since the mid-19th century. This has altered the infiltration run-off ratio (the amount of rainwater absorbed by the soil relative to the amount which runs off) and slope failure has become a menace. The Teesta basin is, therefore, one of the most landslide prone areas of the country, contributing a huge sediment load to the river. The sediment load increases with high monsoon discharge. Around 72 per cent of the suspended load is transported between July and August when the bulk of discharge flows through the river.
Four low dam projects are proposed in this river basin. Stage I and II are proposed on the Rangeet river and the Stage III and IV will be constructed on Teesta. All the four dams fall within the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. Clearances for Stage III are complete and contract for civil works being awarded for the project. Stage III will be closely followed by Stage IV. In Sikkim, Teesta V, another dam, is under construction over river Teesta.
The river basin falls within the Zone IV of seismic zonation map of India prepared by the Bureau of Indian standards and experiences medium to moderate intensity earthquakes. A recent earthquake of magnitude 4.9 on the Richter Scale had occurred in the early morning of 03/12/2001, having its epicenter located near Lachen, North District, Sikkim, around 70-90 km north of the low dam project area. Neo-tectonic movements are very common for such a juvenile orogenic belt like Himalaya and the Main Boundary Thrust passes through the area of TLDP III and IV.
The Teesta river basin and the adjoining valleys are also part of the Indo-Myanmar biodiversity hotspot, being one of the 25 hotspots in the world today. The area is abundant with numerous species of wildlife and rare orchids.
The Teesta basin area is inhabited predominantly by Lepcha, Bhotia, Sherpa and Nepali ethnic groups.
TLDP III
The agreement
The NHPC and the West Bengal State Electricity Board (WBSEB) signed an agreement on November 10, 2000, to develop stages III and IV of the Teesta Low Dam Hydroelectric Project in Darjeeling district bordering Sikkim.
NHPC Chairman and Managing Director Yogendra Prasad, and WBSEB Chairman GD Gautama signed the agreement in the presence of West Bengal Power Minister Shri Mrinal Banerjee.
The project was conceived with a view to even out the adverse hydro-thermal ratio of around 3:97. In the eastern region, the peak hour demand cannot be met due to a shortage, whereas there is surplus power during off-peak period. This creates serious problem of high frequency during off-peak hours and low frequency during peak hours endangering the grid as well as industries and thermal power plants.
These projects, when implemented, will “correct the adverse hydro-thermal ratio which affects supply during the peak hours”, said Mr. Vaidya, the NHPC Chief Engineer.
According to the agreement, West Bengal will get 12 per cent of the power generated by the two units free, 15 per cent will go to the Union ministry of power's account and the rest will be shared according to the usage pattern.
Thus, West Bengal will get another 30 per cent the tariff for which will be determined by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. Bihar may also get 30 per cent while the remaining portions will go to other states.
Moreover, 25 per cent of the technical personnel required for the project will be taken from the WBSEB.
Salient Features of TLDP III
Hydrology
Catchment area : 7755 Sq. KM
Average Annual Rainfall : 2218 MM
Max Disc. Teesta Bazar : 3650 CUMEC
Min. Disc. Teesta Bazar : 86 CUMEC
[TLDP III is 5 kms from Teesta Bazar Village]
Reservoir
FRL : EL 208 M
MDDL : EL 203 M
Gross Storage : 18.36 M CUM
Area (excluding river bed/water body = 75.49 ha : 97.41 HA
Barrage
Type : RCC RAFT with PIERS
Top Elevation : EL 211 M
Crest Level : EL 183 M
Length of Barrage : 193 M
Height of Barrage (at barrage axis) : 27 M
Diversion arrangement : Channel and Dykes, 3710 CU MECS
Spillway
Design Flood : 11130 CU MEC
Type : Gated Weir with Breast Wall
Number, Size : 7 Nos, 14 M (W) X 18 M(W)
Power House
Type : Surface
Gross Head : 22.09 M
Design Discharge : 693.6 CU MEC
Installed Capacity : 4 x 33 MW = 132 MW
Power House : 125 x 22 x 56 M
Tail Channel
Shape : Trapezoidal
Length : 100M
Power Generation
Annual Energy Generation in 90% Dependable Year: 394.42 MU
Estimated cost at December 2002 price level: Rs. 768.92 crores
Cost of energy at Bus bar: Rs. 2.52 per kwh at December 2002 price
During the signing of the agreement on November 10, 2000, the NHPC chairman said, "Although the scheduled time for completion of the project is December 2005, we want to compress it by one year." However, the current information furnished by NHPC indicates a completion target of December 2007.
Financial mobilisation
The entire cost will be borne by NHPC. About 30 per cent of the cost will go as equity and the remaining amount will be borrowed from the financial institutions.
On April 16, 2004, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) sanctioned a line of credit facility of Rs. 6500 crores to NHPC in addition to Rs. 2500 crores sanctioned during the Financial Year 2002-03 pegging up the total investment exposure to Rs.9000 Crores.
An MOU to this effect was signed between Shri S.B.Mathur, Chairman, LIC and Shri Yogendra Prasad CMD, NHPC Ltd. This is the highest ever tie up for NHPC from a single lender to meet the funding requirements through debt for a host of projects sanctioned recently by the Govt. viz., 2000 MW Subansiri Lower H E Project in Arunachal Pradesh, 120 MW Sewa-II Project in J&K AND 132 MW Teesta Low Dam Project in West Bengal.
The interest on credit facility is linked with 13 years’ Government securities yield, which is the most competitive rate available in the market and currently works out to around 6.5% p.a. The overall tenure of loan in 20 years with moratorium of 8 years and the repayment in 24 equal half yearly installments in next 12 years.
NHPC has recently raised USD 50 million ECB for tenure of 10 year with put and call option at the end of 5 year carrying interest rate linked to 6 months JPY LIBOR plus a spread of 1.19% without any security to meet the fund requirements of its ongoing project.
Government of India in 2002-2003 financial year, made a budget provision of Rs. 1341.81 crore for NHPC to support its plan outlay of Rs. 2467.70 crore for ongoing & new projects including TLDP III.
Environment Impact Assessment Report
The North Bengal University (NBU), Darjeeling, prepared the EIA and the EMP (Environment Management Plan) for TLDP III. The report was submitted to the NHPC in August 2002. Advisor to the EIA team was Dr. Pijush Kanti Saha, Vice Chancellor, NBU, the Project Co-ordinator was Dr. D K Hazra, the Dean of Faculty of Science, NBU and the EIA team was led by Dr. A P Das, Department of Botany, NBU.
A careful reading of the EIA and EMP indicates there are several areas that need closer attention, or perhaps a re-look. At times the information and data provided seem disjointed with the inferences and/or mitigation measures recommended; some of the data and information have not been translated into plan of action, and some of the parameters of the study chosen do not have any rationale or are not explained properly. There also exists a huge volume of information and data provided in the EIA, which makes good reading and learning but was not necessary as far as the EMP is concerned. It is also clear various components and/or chapters of the EIA were studied and prepared by the concerned experts; but the final report lacks coordination between chapters and those have not been integrated properly. EIA and EMP should be supplementary and not repetitive or standalone.
Dam criteria
The EIA does not mention why TLDP III is referred to as a low dam even if the height of the barrage is 27 m. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a large dam as one having a dam wall above 15m in height (from the lowest general foundation to the crest). However, even dams between 10-15m in height could be classified as large dams if they satisfy at least any one of the following criteria:
crest length > 500m;
reservoir capacity >1 million m3;
maximum flood discharge >2 000 m3
it has difficult foundation problem
it is of unusual design.
According to the above criteria and considering the maximum discharge data as given in the EIA and reservoir capacity, the hydel project should be considered as a large dam.
Study area
Though the catchment area of river Teesta is 7755 sq. km., the study area for the proposed project has been taken as 7 km. around the proposed reservoir from the FRL and 7 km downstream of dam for EIA studies as given below:
1. Upstream of Barrage Site : 7 km on either side of the proposed reservoir.
2. Downstream of Barrage site : 7 km of either side of the river upto the confluence of Relli Khola with Teesta River.
3. Catchment Area Treatment Area : Rivers directly draining into the reservoir.
The project area has been considered as the area that will be submerged by the reservoir,
or the area up to the FRL.
The EIA does not give any rationale for choosing an arbitrary figure of 7 km. since section 3 of the Schedule II under the EIA Notification, 1994 directs that the study on land use, pollution sources and impact on quality of air, water and land should take into account the area within 10 kms radius of the proposed site.
Community participation in EIA
Fact finding team’s discussion with the people of Geil Khola and 29th Mile (the affected settlements) indicates that these communities were not at all involved in the process of consultation at any stage of Environment Management Planning as implied in the EIA.
Discharge data and impact study for the downstream
According to the EIA, TLDP III is a run-of-the-river scheme. The diversion structures of the project have been envisaged with a view to have the impoundment within the existing river gorge and as such no major submergence is anticipated. Therefore, the construction of the project is not expected to have any adverse impact on this region that could alter the ecological balance of the area.
As this ’run-of-the-river’ dam is going to submerge 184 ha of forest cover and also water bodies for which compensatory afforestation will be taken up, it is not correct to say that there will be no impact on the ecology of the area. EIA also admits certain changes in the downstream areas during construction period, as outlined below:
i. Some construction materials are likely to be deposited in the river bed.
ii. Normal flow of water will be disturbed.
iii. The turbidity of water will increase, which will be maintained almost for the entire period of construction.
Even if we accept the EIA experts’ plea that the above changes are of temporary nature and ‘shall be limited to construction phase of the project’, a span of even five years would be enough for any aquatic biodiversity to undergo an irreversible change and to have an adverse impact on other forms of biodiversity and ecology at the downstream.
The EIA also mentions that the passage of floods through the reservoir will lead to reduction in the peak flow. The dry season flow in the river will also be regulated. Therefore, impact study on downstream biodiversity and ecology and data on downstream seasonal discharge is absolutely necessary. Moreover, as Dr. Rudra (2003) mentions, “the series of proposed dams in the upper reaches will reduce the available discharge … as each hydro power project is expected to consume at least five per cent of the running water in the river.” The downstream discharge will also fluctuate in proportion to the level of power generation. Especially, during the lean season, increased power generation will entail a decrease in down stream discharge of water. Such fluctuations in downstream discharge is bound to have its impacts.
But unfortunately, the same EIA also concludes that since the project is a run-of-the-river scheme, there will be no dry riverbed … the water from the powerhouse will be discharged into the river immediately downstream of the barrage … and hence a flow of water will be maintained in the river. Since, there are no habitations in the vicinity of the project and the human settlements are not dependent on the water of the river Teesta, no impact on their water resource is anticipated. But, what about other resources which depend on water and that also of a river which is swift and agile?
Severe soil erosion, landslides and sedimentation
EIA data related to slope analysis, relative relief, dissection index (DI) and soil depth reveal quite an alarming situation pointing to erosional hazards existing on both left and right bank of Teesta. The DI indicates that approximately 50 per cent of the catchment area is moderately rugged. DI is very high along the River Teesta and this region with high DI experiences maximum landslides. Slope character indicates that slopes are convex in the upper hills, concave in the middle hills dissected by many small streams. The middle hill constitutes unstable slopes and most landslides are located in this part of the slope.
The EIA also mentions that the catchment area is exposed to constant threat from severe soil erosion, landslips and landslides. The report acknowledges that ‘jhora banks and beds are often unstable due to erosion of soil along the banks due to run-off during the rainy season … increase in the outflow of water in the jhora and streams during the rainy season causes widening of the jhora in the hills thereby increasing siltation in the river’. The EIA further says:
“The water disposal arrangements are not sufficient to cope with a rainfall of high intensity. Insufficient or defective means of water disposal are causing severe soil erosion and landslides.
In case of sand and silt deposit, devoid of vegetative cover, continuously exposed to heavy rainfall, a minor tremor can act as a trigger and reduce the shear strength and initiate sand and mudflows. With large-scale road building activities, the road cuttings have become the focal points of the initiation of slips … In many cases, the roads are improperly aligned on weak and unstable rock formation increasing their susceptibility to damage by landslides. Blasting during road making is equivalent to mild seismic activity in the region causing landslides and slips.”
However, the inferences drawn in the EIA report betray these ground realities. The EIA is full of such summary conclusions like:
Major part of the slopes under study area, are presently stable barring a few active landslides.
Though the slide (d/s of Teesta Bazar) is still active, since the location falls almost at the tail end of reservoir, further aggravation of this slide by the reservoir water is not anticipated.
Presently the slide (opposite to Lukubir slide) has attained its natural stability and hence no further aggravation after impounding of the reservoir is expected.
However, elsewhere in the EMP it is said, “After impoundment of the reservoir, the water level in the reservoir area (mostly restricted within the main Tista river valley) will rise considerably. Accordingly, the slope wash/debris at the toe will become surcharged with water and pore pressure within it may considerably increase. The condition may deteriorate when fluctuation in the reservoir level takes place. As a consequence the strength parameters of the slope mass will decrease and it may become susceptible to destablisation. Thus triggering of new landslides, or reactivating old/dormant slides and further destablisation of already active slides cannot be ruled out.”
The sediment load in the river increases with high monsoon discharge. It was observed that 72 per cent of the suspended load is transported between July and August when the bulk of discharge flows through the river. It seems certain that the dynamic equilibrium of the river will be impaired with the construction of the series of dams and the sediment load will be trapped within the reservoirs, reducing their capacity. This, in turn, could compel dam managers to release water during heavy rainfall, causing sudden flash floods downstream (Rudra 2003).
The EIA admits that river Teesta and its tributaries carry a lot of silt even during short duration rainfall. Apart from the gradual ecological degradation, the major causes are also due to geomorphic and hydro geological characteristics of the watersheds in this hilly terrain. The EIA also accepts that India’s development strategy is to promote hydro-electric power, as the demand for electricity is increasing everyday, but the large-scale sedimentation of reservoir during subsequent years posed cognizable problems threatening the very existence of these projects.
Nevertheless, under the catchment area treatment plan, statistically evolved soil conservation measures in the watersheds, rim treatment plan and some engineering and bio engineering measures have been suggested in the EIA and EMP to take care of sedimentation and slope failures.
However, who will implement these plans and how the monitoring will be done is not clear from the reports.
Moreover, on reservoir sedimentation, the project report claims that the crest of the barrage will be kept at EL 183 m i.e. almost at the riverbed, so retrogressive silt flushing, near the intakes is effective. Therefore, no separate silt exclusion arrangement has been provided. It is also proposed to operate the reservoir at EL 205.5. m during monsoon so as to reduce the quantum of sedimentation in the live storage of the reservoir.
Seismicity
As mentioned earlier, the project area falls under Zone IV of the seismic zonation map of India prepared by the Bureau of Indian Standards. Several moderate to high magnitude earthquakes have occurred during the past in the vicinity of the area. A list of 8 earthquakes of magnitude of more than 6 and up to 7.6 in the Richter Scale between 1897 and 1990 near the proposed project site has been provided by the EIA.
The EIA was published without any study for the site specific seismic design parameters as it was still awaiting the results of the study done by the University of Roorkee. The EIA only says that the University of Roorkee recommendations shall be utilized for final design of the project components.
The conclusions and recommendations of the Geological Survey of India report on the geological and geotechnical investigations of TLDP III and IV, commissioned by the North Bengal University, were not incorporated in the section on seismicity.
Migratory behaviour of fishes
Species of migratory fishes in the Teesta have the following characteristics:
1. some spawn in clear waters in the upstream, post monsoon;
2. some resides in the upstream but migrates during monsoon;
3. the others prefer cooler torrential waters in the upstream.
Though the EIA does mention that there are at least three local migrants whose movement pattern is likely to be disturbed by the barrage construction, it also concludes in the same vein that since the proposed barrage has an effective fish pass, the migration of these fishes will not be affected. There is also no word on impact of temperature change, turbidity of water or fluctuations in discharge over fish population and their migration.
Quarry sites
Most of the quarries have been located within the riverbed area with primary view of minimizing the land acquisition, and preventing instability due to exploitation.
The proposed quarry sites are Riyang Khola (2 km. d/s of project site), Geil Khola (5 km. u/s), Kalijhora (14 km. d/s), Teesta Bazar (10 km. u/s), Relli Khola (0.5 km. d/s), Teesta River (6 km. u/s), Lohapool (6 km. d/s), Teesta Valley (8 km. d/s) and Sevoke village (d/s of Kallijhora).
While moving on the NH 31A, the fact finding team observed that with construction in full swing the entire stretch between Kalijhora and Teesta Bazar will be dotted with such quarries every 2 to 4 kms. The number of heavy vehicles will increase manifold. The rate of quarrying to excavate at least 800,000 cum of material will lead to instability in this highly eco-fragile area and vegetation both in and outside the quarry sites will be destroyed. In fact, 3 out of 7 sites have vegetation within. Moreover, the entire stretch will be covered by thick and harmful sand and silica dust, and fugitive fumes from crushers.
Environmental impact during construction phase
Air quality
The ambient air quality data as provided by the EIA indicate presence of particulates, CO, SO2 and NOx though their impact is minimal – mainly from vehicular traffic. Though it is acknowledged that the area will have some impact during the construction phase, no data, especially that of suspended particles have been furnished since it will be ‘temporary in nature’ and ‘there will be little impact on the ambient air quality of the area’.
Noise pollution
The normal noise level recorded in the project area is quite low – 40 dBA – mainly generated by vehicular traffic. There is the possibility of increase in noise pollution during construction due to increased vehicular movement and construction equipments. While the EIA accepts that this may cause adverse impact due to increase in the base noise levels, nature of impact has not been given since ’there are no major habitations within 2-3 km. of the project site’.
Public hearing: access to information and public participation
The process of Public Hearing under Schedule IV is an integral part of the EIA Notification, 1994 and mandatory for environmental clearance.
According to the EIA notification
i. executive summary of Detailed Project Report (DPR) and EIA both in English as well as local language have to be provided for public scrutiny;
ii. The State Pollution Control Board shall publish a notice for environmental public hearing in at least two newspapers widely circulated in the region around the project, one of which shall be in vernacular language of the locality concerned.
iii. All persons including bona fide residents, environmental groups and others located at the project site/sites of displacement/sites likely to be affected can participate in the public hearing.
The Fact Finding Team after speaking to the villagers near the project site, and the local environmental groups, came across serious violations of the EIA notification both by the NHPC, the project proponent and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB).
On November 14, 2002 the WBPCB issued the public hearing notice for TLDP III to be held on December 19, 2002. The notification did not mention the EIA and said that only the executive summary of the DPR would be available for public scrutiny.
However, the executive summary of the DPR was not available with the regional office of the WBPCB or such other places stipulated in the notification. After a period of 10 days the said executive summary was made available only in English in the WBPCB office and on December 6, 2002 only the document was made available in Nepali.
After some of the local groups protested and challenged the legality of the public hearing process, the NHPC authorities sent a copy of the EIA in English only to the WBPCB regional office on December 10, 2002 just 10 days before the public hearing. No Nepali version was ever available. The WBPCB was also forced to postpone the public hearing to January 3, 2003 by a notification of 13.12.2002, but without a mandatory period of at least 30 days. In this regard, NESPON sent letters to MoEF, WBPCB and NHPC during the months of November, December 2002 and January 2003.
The public hearing was held in a village called Deorali on the Takdah road, up the hills on the right bank of Teesta, located at least 3 km. from the project site. This village was never identified as project affected, nor are there any project affected families or persons, whereas the project affected are from Geilkhola and 29th Mile settlements. Incidentally the EMP indicates that NHPC has selected the above village to adopt it as a model village.
The villagers of Geil Khola and 29th Mile told the fact finding team that they were made aware of the public hearing process by NESPON and other local groups and so they went in large numbers to attend the public hearing. But, they had no information from NHPC on either the project or the EIA. NESPON members gave a brief on the both to them.
A mass petition demanding postponement of the public hearing till EIA report was made available in local language was submitted during the public hearing by 84 local community members. No amount of objection from the people concerned could stop the public hearing.
The public hearing panel comprised the Chief Engineer, WBPCB, Chief Environment Officer, WBPCB, SDO Kalimpong, Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council representative, Chief Engineer, WBSEB, and the gram panchyat representatives of Rangli, Mungpoo, Samthar and Riang. The list of panel members does not indicate presence of senior citizens of the project affected area.
The fact finding team reported these anomalies and violations to the District Magistrate of Darjeeling, Dr. Aftab, and requested him to call for a fresh public hearing. As he joined only in November 2003, he could only give an assurance to look into the matter.
Soumitra Ghosh, Secretary of NESPON, told the team that in a joint letter to the MoEF signed by representatives of NESPON, Kalpavriksh and South Asia Network of Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), reported these violations together with anomalies in EIA.
The Fact Finding team did not have EIA and EMP documents during its visit. When the NHPC Chief Engineer was requested to make the documents available to the team, he directed the team members to the regional office of the WBPCB where the concerned environment officer told the team that he could not ‘locate’ the documents.
Thereafter, the team managed to get copies of EIA and EMP – both public documents - from an unofficial source.
Interestingly, the EMP shows that for pollution control board, public hearing etc. (under Budget head miscellaneous expenses) a budget of Rs. 25,00,000.00 was proposed!
Social impact: rehabilitation and resettlement
In the project area, the NHPC has proposed acquisition of land up to 210 m along the river bank, slightly above the FRL of 208 m. Project affected have been identified accordingly – those impacted by this land acquisition.
As per the land acquisition of the submergence zone, six houses (9 families, with a total of 31 persons) have been identified by NHPC as directly affected. Six of these families are from four houses in Geil Khola while the remaining three families belong to two households in 29th Mile. Another 19 persons, 18 from 29th Mile and 1 from Geil Khola whose land holdings fall within the submergence area are earmarked for compensation. Both these settlements are on the right bank of Teesta along the NH 31A to Gangtok. Only one of the six houses, in 29th Mile is pucca, and one has tap water. The ST families are earmarked for special benefit plan.
Confusion prevailed in both Geil Khola and 29th Mile regarding the status of the people there since they did not have any direct information from the NHPC or any other agency. They only said that some survey was done in this area and perhaps the four houses located almost at the level of river bed below the settlement were required to move out. Discussions with the settlers of 29th Mile also indicated that they were either misinformed or ill-informed by some officials of NHPC regarding protection measures to be taken for other riverside dwellings. In 29th Mile, as there were a few roadside shops and caterings, people were apprehensive about continuation of their activities once the construction work for the project is taken up in full swing. They were not willing to believe the words of the NHPC officials. The same apprehension has spread amongst all the Stage III settlements right up to Teesta Bazar.
In Geil Khola, the fact finding team was told that during the public hearing, many of the villagers demanded that:
1. all villages in the Stage III area be included in the project’s R & R plan as project affected;
2. the rehabilitation process is completed much before the actual commencement of the project work; and
3. the NHPC enters into a legal agreement with the villagers guaranteeing whatever amenities and facilities they were promising to the villagers (many of them actually ended up carrying court papers with well drafted agreements).
The EIA identifies directly affected families whose dwellings or homestead lands are in the submergence zone and have to be shifted from their present location and rehabilitated in other areas. The EIA also identified persons for compensation whose cultivated lands fall within the submergence zone. Surprisingly, in the EMP, the project affected families are divided into two categories, completely affected and partially affected – the ones whose homestead land/dwelling units comes under submergence and those whose cultivated land is affected, respectively.
The fact finding team came to know that details of rehabilitation and compensation were not discussed with the project affected. Dhan Bahadur Pradhan, Krishna Bahadur, Purna Bahadur Rai from Geil Khola and Nirmala Chhetri of 29th Mile could not tell the team where they will be rehabilitated and how much compensation will they get. The affected households do not have a fixed salaried income. The adult members earn their livelihood as porters, daily wage labourers and only one family owns a roadside shop. Average income per month ranges between <2,000 – 3,000 in Geil Khola and <3,000 - 5,000 in 29th Mile.
However, the EMP indicates that the rehabilitation package for the completely affected include, land for construction of house, land for agriculture, special grant for house building, transportation charge for cattle and house hold items and provision for drinking water, drainage and electrification of houses.
The resettlement site is located on the right bank of Rambi Khola near Rambi Bazar, at the fag end of the proposed NHPC colony that is around 4 kms from the project site. The NHPC claims that facilities like roads, schools, bank, post office, hospital, supermarket etc. to be provided for the project colony will also be extended to the project affected. The total rehabilitation package for one family toward assistance for relocation, construction of house comes out to be Rs. 85,000.00.
For the partially affected, NHPC will provide the required cash for the loss of agricultural land. No other details are provided.
It should also be noted that for the people being displaced for a power project producing 132 MW, each of the newly built houses will be provided with a single connection of 60W and NHPC will bear the cost of the energy for the first five years and thereafter, the families will be charged for the energy consumed according to the prevalent norms.
There are no details of socio-economic impact study on the Stage III settlements during the construction and post-construction phase. But the EIA summarily concludes that:
“Construction of the project will provide increased job opportunities during construction as skilled and unskilled labourers by contractors as well as through petty contracts. And hence the socio-economic status of the PAFs will be improved. There will be improvement in the transport facility, education, medical and marketing facilities. It will help build infrastructure facilities, water supply, sanitation and communication facilities. The influx of migrant workers may cause some dilution of the style and cultural values of the local communities. The social life style of the people may change which may be more beneficial than harmful to the community.
NHPC proposes a rehabilitation and resettlement committee to monitor and implement the process. It is the same old story of a committee comprising of predominantly state government and project officials with a representative of the project affected. The rehabilitation and resettlement, in that case becomes the sole responsibility of the project proponent and much will depend upon the will of the NHPC itself.
Role of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council
Including TLDP III, four dams are coming up on the Teesta along an area which is under the jurisdiction of the DGHC. Since DGHC is an autonomous body having a role of decentralized governance for the local people, it was imperative that there would be some kind of participation of the DGHC in the proposed projects. There is no information on this anywhere. The agreement is between NHPC and WBSEB. The state government will receive free energy in lieu of the agreement. Administratively, the river basin, the affected people are under the jurisdiction of the DGHC, but it seems that DGHC has no role to play in terms of the planning, design and administration of various components of the project.
The fact finding team met Mr. Gaulan Lepcha, the MLA (Member, Legislative Assembly) of Kalimpong. He said that he had not been consulted at any stage of the project. In fact, he was not aware that such a project was coming up until the local people informed him. The NHPC does not invite him in their meetings. He made it clear, that in that respect, he is against the proposed project. He also told the team that the main political party of the region, the GNLF has not taken any stand with respect to TLDP III. But very soon, it has to take a stand. He also pleaded for more information on the project. In conclusion, it has been a “wait and watch” policy for the party.
Lacunae in the EIA
There are several lacunae in the EIA. Lack of useful data and information pertaining to certain important parameters have already been discussed in the earlier parts of the report. But, the EIA has not taken into note a very important parameter – the glacier recession, although Dr. Subir Sarkar, an important member of the EIA team, did mention this possibility to the fact finding team.
The proposed TLDP III and three other dams will be built on a snow-fed Himalayan river. With its source being a glacier, the EIA missed a very critical issue—the rapid recession of glaciers—which could have significant impacts on river regimes. Teesta is sustained by glacial melt, snowmelt run-off and monsoon rainfall. A 1999 study of the International Commission for Snow and Ice ahs warned that glaciers in the Himalayas are receding faster than in any other part of the world and, at present rates, are likely to disappear by 2035. The information on meltwater yield and its chemical and sediment characteristics is vital to the safety and maintenance of the hydroelectric installations and reservoirs in the Himalayas.
High-altitude lakes formed as a result of glacial melt are potentially very dangerous. Moraine dams (created by debris accumulated by glacial action on mountain slopes and valley floors) holding back these waters are comparatively unstable and a sudden breach can lead to the discharge of huge volumes of water and debris. Such Glacial lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) cause catastrophic flooding downstream with serious damage to life, property, forests, farms and infrastructure – including dams. In recent years, GLOFs have impacted Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bhutan and China. A major GLOF in August 1985 in Nepal caused extensive damage destroying the Namche hydel project. Another in June 2000 damaged the Naptha Jhakri hydel project, under construction in Himachal Pradesh. In July 2003, a flash flood during the construction of Parvati hydel project by NHPC in Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, killed 40 workers. The flash flood was the result of a cloudburst.
For a dam project like TLDP III dam break analysis is mandatory. However, the EIA has not included such an analysis on the plea that the proposed TLDP IV is coming up in the downstream of TLDP III and a dam break analysis is only needed for the TLDP IV.
It is also not always clear from the data and information furnished in the EIA whether such data have been collected over a 12 months period or over three seasons at least. Mostly, data regarding rainfall, water discharge, temperature, pollution have been put either on an average basis or for monsoon and lean period or for winter and summer or on a maximum and minimum basis.
FINDINGS
A. Considering that four dams in north Bengal are proposed in the Teesta River Basin and six more in the upstream located within Sikkim, it was imperative that a River Basin study including carrying capacity study of Teesta should have been prepared. In fact, the clearance to Teesta V in Sikkim was given with the stipulation that no more dams will be built till a carrying capacity study of Teesta was done. This study commissioned by MoEF, however, has not been made public. No such study has been recommended in case of four dams in north Bengal.
B. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIA) for TLDP III, which is an important instrument for environmental clearance, is a shoddily prepared document, to say the least. The EIA is incoherent in places, not objective in its conclusions, lacks clarity, violates provisions of EIA notification 1994 while choosing parameters, have huge lacunae and glaring gaps, and smacks of possible suppression of data in places. This is not a comprehensive EIA.
C. The EIA is supposed to be prepared using data over a period of 12 months or three seasons. Where as what we mostly find in the EIA are qualifying words like average, monsoon and lean period, summer and winter, maximum and minimum and not a further break up of data and information over a definite time period. Which is a violation of the EIA notification 1994 and hence its data and information cannot be considered as comprehensive.
i. The EIA parameters have been deliberately simplified and vague on thew pretext that the project is run-of-the-river and hence does not require detailed information on many crucial angles. The ‘run-of-the-river’ cover has also helped the NHPC to downplay the intensity and nature of impacts between the construction phases. On a number of occasions, the EIA simply concludes that the impacts will be minimal (and also no impact foreseen) and temporary during the construction phase and things will come back to normal during the operational phase.
ii. While the catchment of the river Teesta is 7755 sq. m, the EIA has taken a radial distance of 7 Km.s around the project site—both upstream and downstream—as the study area . This is a clear violation of the EIA notification 1994.
iii. The EMP does not include specific implementation schedules for a number of suggested impact mitigation measures like catchment area treatment, soil conservation, anti-erosion measures and watershed area intervention.
a. The EIA does not contain any downstream discharge data for TLDP III and ignores the downstream impact factor. The EIA has concluded that there will be no downstream impact since the river flow will not be blocked; an observation not at all objective.
b. The EIA does not provided enough data on river sedimentation load, information essential to study the life span, sustainability and viability of a dam.
c. Though the EIA, in a number of places has admitted the recurring phenomena and frequent possibilities of landslides and landslips, erosions and run-offs, these phenomena have not got enough attention from both the EIA experts and the project proponent, the NHPC. A major characteristic of the river valley—a geological and geomorphological feature—has been treated in mere terms of engineering and bioengineering mitigation measures, and the EIA suppresses and withholds data generated by its own expert agency-the GSI, during the course of the study.
d. The EIA and EMP do not incorporate any data on the seismic impact on the dam. There has been no attempt so far by the NHPC authorities to disseminate the results of the impact study to be submitted by the University of Roorkee.
e. Along with the above, absence of dam break analysis should be considered a major violation of the EIA norms.
f. As mentioned earlier the EIA has failed to consider the phenomenon of glacial recession in the Himalayas and the impact of Glacial Lake Outburst Flow (GLOF) thus seriously compromising the safety and viability of the dam.
g. The EIA was never the result of a participatory process as claimed by the experts. The project affected or the people of Stage III settlements were not consulted at any stage of the preparation of the project. No local social welfare or environmental groups were ever consulted.
h. There is no mention of how the EMP will be monitored and by whom.
i. The EIA has also lent credence to the NHPC claim that the proposed project is a low dam violating prevalent international norms defining categories of dams. Such expostulations seriously question the integrity of the EIA team, considering that the EIA and EMP have been prepared by a known group of experts of the North Bengal University, a local institution, respected by the people of Darjeeling and north Bengal.
j. Finally, the fact finding team felt that a careful reading of the EIA and EMP of the TLDP III shows that the reports seemed to be tailor-made for NHPC to get an environment clearance. And NHPC has achieved that purpose by remunerating the University with a handsome 27 lakhs (rupees 2.7 million).
iv. Another gross violation of the EIA notification has been the entire process of public hearing and it is difficult to understand how such violations in public could withstand the scrutiny of MoEF.
a. This entire process of subverting the principles of access to information and participation of the local people by the NHPC is a clear violation of the accepted international norms made mandatory for government agencies, project proponents through adoption and ratification of Principle 10 and Agenda 21 of Rio Convention 1992.
b. The NHPC had earmarked Rs. 25 lakhs (rupees 2.5 million) as expenses for this sham public hearing and related processes!
It should also be noted here that the EIA and EMP were not made available to the fact finding team while they were in north Bengal even after requests were made to the NHPC and the regional office of the WBPCB.
v. Rehabilitation and Resettlement part of the TLDP III is perhaps the weakest and most neglected component in the entire project plan considering that the number of displaced is small compared to other dam projects. Where the NHPC itself has identified only 9 completely affected families and 19 partially affected households, the resettlement plan developed so far could have been much more innovative and would have stood out as an outstanding model to be followed in other projects. The resettlement plan could have been prepared with a long term perspective ensuring that the livelihood of the project affected is harmonious with the economy and development of the surrounding area. The plan should also entail both quantitative and qualitative increase in the livelihood earnings of the affected families.
a. The criterion for identifying the project affected is only the submergence of homestead land and cultivable land. No other impact, direct or indirect, has been considered. The criterion for identifying the project affected and the rehabilitation and resettlement plan has not been prepared in consultation with the affected or the local people. The affected families have no idea of what is going to happen to them. They have no information – rather, if at all – misinformation provided by the officials.
b. The local people have demanded that all the stage III settlements which include at least five settlements including Teesta Bazar and Peshok should be included in the R & R plan.
c. Nine families – 6 of Geil Khola and 3 of 29th Mile have been identified as completely affected since their homestead land will be submerged, and 19 persons – 18 from 29th Mile and 1 from Geil Khola have been identified as the partially affected because their cultivated land will be submerged.
d. Nine families will be resettled on a new land at the fag end of the proposed NHPC project colony near Rambhi Bazar, 7 kms. from the project site. At present, this area is completely underdeveloped and needs well connected roads, water and electricity connections, besides other amenities like school, markets, hospital etc. NHPC is proposing a package consisting of 200 sq. m of land, house building assistance, relocation expenses, provision of drinking water, drainage facility and electrification of houses, a package costing Rs. 85,000 for each of the families affected. The total cost thus incurred will be a negligible percentage to the actual cost of building the dam. Moreover, each house will be provided with an electricity connection of 60 W which will be paid by the NHPC for the first five years only.
e. The situation of the partially affected persons is the worst. Their cultivable lands and homes are located in the same settlement. The R & R plan provides for cash compensation for the land lost. Nothing is mentioned about the costs involved and rules out the standard procedure of land for land compensation. In effect they will also be displaced but NHPC will not provide for their resettlement.
f. There is no mention of any other criteria for identifying the project affected and no contingency plan has been drawn up if such needs arise during the construction and/or operational phase.
g. Apart from arranging some kiosks and training of girls and women in tailoring, embroidery etc. the NHPC has chosen not to facilitate these people to enter into better livelihood options. NHPC is happy that they can work as casual daily labourers and petty contractors during the construction of the project.
vi. Though the State Government of West Bengal has been promised 12 per cent of the power generated free of charge by the NHPC, there is no indication or information on how this power will be utilized or what will be the benefits accruing to the area under Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council out of this hydel project.
vii. When the agreement was signed between WBSEB and NHPC in November 2000, the cost of the project was declared as Rs. 636 crores (rupees 6.36 billion) whereas in December 2002 this cost was escalated to Rs. 783 crores (rupees 7.83 billion). The corresponding tariff for power produced stood at Rs. 2.52 at December 2002 price level. This indicates that the project is undergoing cost escalation which will have a compounding effect and impact on many other components including unit power cost.
viii. Similarly, in November 2000, Yogendra Prasad, the chairman of NHPC claimed that the project will be finished by December 2005 but NHPC will try to compress it by another year – a deadline of December 2004. Now that has been extended to 2007.
ix. TLDP III is financially promoted with the help of budgetary support of the Central Government covering 30 per cent of the total cost and loans mopped up by NHPC from LIC. No other information is available to the public regarding their financial mobilization for the project.
x. The primary rationale given by NHPC for the construction of these four dams in Teesta Valley totaling 432 MW and that of the Farakka at 125 MW was to stabilize the power generation in the State affected by the adverse thermal-hydel ratio of 97:3! These five projects together may produce 557 MW, around 8 per cent of the present power generation of about 6,800 MW where as the transmission loss in the state is said to be 28 per cent. If this loss can be reduced the state on the other hand may not need these hydel projects at all.
xi. The proposed four dams on Teesta are envisaged in an ecologically fragile area which is considered a part of one of the richest biodiversity hotspots in the world. The Teesta valley and river basin with its diverse, rare and endangered flora and fauna, seismic and landslide history, necessitates an assessment of equity impacts of dams. The economic viability of dam should be seen in terms of comparative cost analysis between the cost of preventing and mitigating the social and environmental impacts and the cost of what cannot be prevented or mitigated.
xii. The fact finding team after their visit of the Teesta river valley in Darjeeling, meeting various stakeholders, the project affected and making a detailed assessment of the available project documents felt that the techno-economic aspects of hydel projects, the profit motive of the project proponent like NHPC and an arbitrary way of promoting increased power generations without weighing available options still get precedence over the social and environmental factors related to dams.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
i. As the nodal agency for environmental clearance, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government of India, should keep the environmental clearance given in abeyance, review the entire EIA notification process including re-assessing the EIA and EMP documents for TLDP III before giving a go ahead to the project.
ii. Failing which the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environment and Forests should enquire into the process of environmental clearance given to TLDP III by the MOEF and take necessary and appropriate action.
iii. Because the project is partly supported by the Government of India, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA), should initiate a process of reviewing the economic viability and sustainability of the project before allowing the construction of the project to commence. The former Chief Engineer of NHPC, Shri Suhas Roy had already indicated that the life of the dam might not be more than 50 years.
iv. NHPC projects should be governed by public accountability and as such all the steps taken by the NHPC, MOEF, CCEA and other agencies should be transparent with scope for effective people’s participation in decision making.
v. There is an immediate need for Teesta River Basin-wide study including the carrying capacity study of Teesta before starting new hydel projects in the valley. A comprehensive environment impact assessment of the entire basin and not individual projects should be undertaken.
vi. The phrase low dam project should be immediately dropped as it is a misnomer and bordering on providing false information and data.
vii. The rehabilitation and resettlement plan for TLDP III should be scrapped and redrafted in consultation with and participation of the TLDP Stage III settlement people, interested individuals and social welfare groups and NGOs.
viii. An independent agency, professionally managed, experienced and committed to meaningful rehabilitation of the project affected and displaced should be given charge of implementing the plan in consultation and participation of the project affected, representatives of local governments and interested groups and NGOs. The implementation of the R & R should never be left with the project proponent, in this case, the NHPC.
ix. In this respect, the NHPC should make public its Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy.
x. NHPC should immediately make public the report of the University of Roorkee on seismic activity in the region and mitigation measures and the dam break analysis for TLDP III.
xi. NHPC should also make public its pre-construction phase catchment treatment plan, watershed area intervention and soil conservation measures with appropriate time line and implementation schedules.
xii. The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) under whose jurisdiction the project site is located has not played any major role in this respect. The fact finding team feels that it is high time that the DGHC should intervene in the process, assess the benefits that the project is going to provide to the DGHC and its people and also find out how and where the free energy supposed to be provided to the State Government will be utilized since the DGHC and its people could always demand a fare share of that.
xiii. There is scope for the project affected concerned individuals and groups in the area to seek legal remedy if the NHPC is allowed to go ahead with the construction of TLDP III.
xiv. Considering that 10 dams are going to be constructed in the Teesta Basin area covering large tracts of Sikkim and Darjeeling, the local people should be made aware of the principles of environmental governance and their legal rights to access to information and participation in decision making process.
With each hydel and dam project being proposed in the country today, each dam being financed and constructed we, the people are still left with a few questions –
Have the development needs and objectives been formulated in this country through an open, transparent and participatory process at local, regional and national levels?
Has a comprehensive options assessment for water and energy resource development been done?
Have the social and environmental factors been given the same significance as techno-economic aspects in assessing options?
Do we have a basin wide understanding of the ecology of the rivers and the dependence of local communities on them
There just must be some structural damage on the stage III dam not to mention huge losses of equipment. Do they have to start again? Who is the insurance company I wonder...or will they just continue and put band-aids on it. You tell me.
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